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Abstract 
In the five-year period 2005-09, Brazil has dramatically reduced carbon emissions by around 
25% and at the same time has kept a stable economic growth rate of 3.5% annually. This 
combination of economic growth and emissions reduction is unique in the world. The driver 
was  a  dramatic  reduction  in  deforestation  in  the  Amazonian  forest  and  the  Cerrado 
Savannah. This shift empowered the sustainability social forces in Brazil to the point that the 
national  Congress  passed  (December  2009)  a  very  progressive  law  internalising  carbon 
constraints and promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy. The transformation in 
Brazil’s  carbon  emissions  profile  and  climate  policy  has  increased  the  potentialities  of 
convergence between the European Union and Brazil.  
The first part of this paper examines the assumption on which this paper is based, mainly 
that the trajectory of carbon emissions and climate/energy policies of the G20 powers is 
much more important than the United Nations multilateral negotiations for assessing the 
possibility of global transition to a low-carbon economy. The second part analyses Brazil’s 
position in the global carbon cycle and public policies since 2005, including the progressive 
shift in 2009 and the contradictory dynamic in 2010-12. The final part analyses the potential 
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1.  The trajectory of emissions of the major powers 
According to most scientific evidence, a solid transition to a low-carbon economy assumes 
three  principal  dimensions:  the  continuous  reduction  of  carbon  emissions  in  developed 
countries; an accelerated decrease in the emissions growth curve – and the establishment of a 
stabilising  year  –  for  emerging  mid-income  countries  before  2020;  and,  an  accelerated 
decrease in the carbon intensity of GDP globally. In the case of rich countries, there should 
be  an  accelerated  decrease  in  the  per  capita  emissions,  and  in  the  cases  of  mid-income 
countries, an accelerated reduction in the carbon intensity of GDP and a light and continued 
fall in per capita emissions. Poor countries would still be allowed space to increase their per 
capita emissions (Stern, 2009; Viola et al., 2013).  
Emissions of GHGs grew by 3% during the first decade of the 21st century.1 Including also 
figures on deforestation and agriculture of diverse sources for some countries, the leading 
emitters in 2010 were: China, responsible for 25% of the global total (and a 5% annual growth 
over the last decade), the US with 17% of total emissions (and 0.8% annual growth), the 
European Union (27 countries) at 12% of the total (growing at 0.4% annually), India with 8% 
of the total (growing at 6% per year), Russia with 5% of the total (and annual growth of 4%), 
Indonesia with 4.5% of the total (growing by 5% per year), and Brazil at 4% of the total (4% 
annual growth until 2004, which drastically reduced between 2005 and 2009).  
The  G20  countries  are  responsible  for  over  80%  of  global  emissions  and  constitute  three 
critical groups of super, great and medium powers (Viola, Franchini & Ribeiro , 2012). The 
G20 forum has itself since 2008 became crucial in terms of the potential for building up much 
needed global governance, both in economics and climate. The peak attempt for developing 
global climate governance in the G20 framework was at the London Summit in April 2009. 
The  initiative  had  the  support  of  Germany,  France,  United  States,  Japan,  South  Korea, 
Mexico and the European Union. The then newly started Obama administration was at the 
peak of its commitment to climate change mitigation, consistent with its electoral campaign 
platform. But there was strong opposition from China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, 
Argentina,  Indonesia  and  Saudi  Arabia.  After  the  COPS  15  failure  in  December  2009  at 
Copenhagen, the subsequent summits of the G20 showed stagnation in developing global 
governance  both  in  economic  and  climate  policies.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  the  most 
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important arena for building up global governance in these fields. The G20 meeting in Los 
Cabos  in  June  2012  approved  a  soft  declaration  in  favour  of  a  gradual  elimination  of 
subsidies for fossil fuels.2 
The three super powers – the United States, the European Union and China – share three 
highly relevant characteristics: 
  First and most essential, each one is responsible for a high proportion of global carbon 
emissions (at least 12%) and of global GDP. 
  Secondly, they possess important technological and human capital for decarbonising 
the economy. 
  Finally,  they  have  veto  power  over  any  global  international  accord  that  could  be 
effective. 
The three super powers stand for a half of global GDP and 54% of global carbon emissions. 
The European Union is isolated in its defence of an effective global architecture for a rapid 
transition  to  a  low-carbon  economy.  The  US  and  China  resist  a  global  agreement  on  a 
transition to low-carbon.  
Five major countries (India, Russia, Japan, South Korea and Brazil) are important players in 
addition to the climate super powers. India is growing very fast in terms of its share of the 
total and likely will surpass the European Union and the United States at some point in the 
present  decade.  Japan  already  has  one  of  the  less-intensive  carbon  economies  and has  a 
strong human and technological capacity for the transition to a low-carbon economy. Russia 
is the most difficult country: it has a very intensive carbon economy and high per capita 
emissions and a significant part of its elites and population believes that climate change 
could  be  beneficial.  Brazil  has  the  least  carbon-intensive  energy  matrix  of  the  relevant 
countries and will be the focus of this article. South Korea is the more reform-minded of the 
great  powers  since  2008,  as  is  reflected  in  its  public  policies  and  its  strong  human  and 
technological capacity for decarbonising the economy.  
The  recent  performance  of  the  middle  powers  in  terms  of  trajectory  of  emissions  and 
climate/energy policies allows us to classify them into two groups: conservatives (Canada, 
Indonesia, Argentina, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) and progressives (Mexico, Australia and 
South Africa). Canada is conservative because of the strong power of the oil-rich province of 
Alberta  in  the  complex  federal  arrangement,  and  Australia  was  definitively  conservative 
until 2007, but it began to enter the progressive camp in September 2011 when it approved a 
carbon tax.  
The  failure  of  the  Copenhagen  Conference  to  reach  a  binding  agreement  increased  the 
questioning of the United Nations’ multilateral negotiations framework. It is very difficult to 
conduct consistent negotiations among 170 countries (this count considers the 27 European 
Union  countries  as  one)  when  around  140  of  them  do  not  play  a  significant  role  in  the 
production of the problem nor its potential solution, although most of them are the more 
vulnerable to climate change. There is an increasing perception among analysts and decision-
makers in the most important countries that in the near future the prevailing approach will 
be  bottom-up  and  that  the  most  important  reference  already  exist  in  the  form  of  the 
commitments submitted by all the important countries to the Copenhagen Accord at the 
beginning of 2010. The precarious agreement reached at the 17th COP in Durban 2011 didn’t 
change the situation in any significant way.  
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The formation of a successful de-carbonisation alliance in the world depends on positive 
changes in the stance of the United States and an acceleration in the new Chinese energy 
policy initiated in 2008. Positive changes in each one of the super powers will likely affect the 
others and will re-energise the European commitment. Once these changes in the US and 
China are achieved, a coalition of the US, the EU, Japan, China, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, 
Australia and South Africa could put pressure on Russia, India, Canada, Turkey, Argentina, 
Saudi  Arabia  and  Indonesia  to  accelerate  decarbonising  measures  in  their  respective 
economies. The extensive negotiations of this process would take place in multiple arenas: 
bilaterally,  mainly  US-China,  China-EU  and  US-EU,  but  also  Brazil-US,  Brazil-EU,  etc…; 
trilaterally  (US,  China,  EU);  and,  multilaterally,  the  G20  –  where  South  Korea,  Mexico, 
Australia  and  Brazil  could  play  an  active  reformist  role  vis-à-vis  India,  Russia  and 
conservative middle powers. After a consistent agreement would be reached in the G20, the 
capacity of persuasion over all United Nations countries will likely be very strong and a 
formal multilateral agreement could be signed.  
2.  Brazil in the global carbon cycle and public policies since 2005 
Brazil  is  a  key  country  in  the  world  in  terms  of  the  carbon  cycle  and  natural  and 
environmental resources because it possesses:  
  the most important carbon stock in forests in the world, 
  the largest stock of biodiversity in the world, 
  the largest reserve of agricultural land and the most competitive agribusiness in the 
world, 
  the third largest stock of fresh water in the world, after Russia and Canada, 
  the most efficient and second largest – after the US – production of ethanol in the 
world (Goldemberg, 2007) and 
  the largest reserve of hydropower in the world that could be easily used because it has 
a globally competitive industry in the field. 
According to the Second National Emissions Inventory Communication (SNEIC),3 in 2005 
Brazil generated around 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2e – methane and nitrous oxide. In 2005 
Brazil accounted for around 5% of global carbon emissions. In 2005 Brazil was the fifth-
largest emitter in the world after the US, China, the European Union and India. In terms of 
per capita emissions Brazil produced in 2005 approximately 11.5 tonnes CO2e, which was 
60% that of the Americans, 20% more than the European Union, twice the Chinese and seven 
times the Indians. In 2005, the carbon intensity of the Brazilian economy was around 1.7 
tonnes of carbon per $1,000 of GDP, higher than the US and the EU, but lower than China 
and India.4 
Between  2005  and  2009,  however,  Brazil  broke  the  trend  and  was  able  to  reduce  GHG 
emissions  by  approximately  25%  –  the  largest  reduction  ever  recorded.  This  dramatic 
decrease  was  caused  by  a  remarkable  fall  in  Amazonian  deforestation:  from  an  annual 
average of almost 21,000 km2 in 2000-04 to 6,200 km2 in 2009-11 (Brazil, 2010b). Deforestation 
reduction in the Amazon was a product of the following drivers:  
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i)  Strong  commitment  to  reducing  deforestation  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment, 
headed by the Senator from Acre state Marina Silva, dating from the start of the Lula 
administration  (January  2003).  After  almost  two  years  of  procrastination  by  the 
President  –  with  deforestation  increasing  during  2003  and  2004  –  the  Minister  was 
powerful  enough  to  impose  a  shift  in  Amazonian  policy.  Since  2005  until  2009, 
deforestation reduction in the Amazon was at the core of the federal government’s 
programme. Since 2010 the federal government no longer aims to reduce deforestation, 
but rather to avoid a new increase.  
ii)  Dramatic increase in law enforcement by the federal government once the Presidency 
of  the  country  ordered  the  Federal  Police  and  other  federal  agencies  to  increase 
cooperation with the Minister of Environment in stopping illegal deforestation. In 1997, 
Brazil passed a law strongly limiting deforestation to 20% of the private property in the 
Amazonian region. No capitalist country in the world has seen such severe interference 
in private property as Brazil in the Amazon. But the resistance to the law had been 
very strong until 2005, with unwillingness of the federal government to enforce the law 
and strong opposition from most state governments.  
iii)  Strengthening of the scientific and technological capabilities of the Institute of Space 
Research  (INPE)  in  charge  of  satellite  monitoring  of  deforestation.  INPE  became  a 
major global player in assessing deforestation and regional climate modelling.  
iv)  Formation  of  multi-stakeholders  coalitions  against  exportation  and  domestic 
consumption  of  soy  and  beef  coming  from  deforested  areas.  These  coalitions  were 
composed of international, national and local entities, some corporations, the scientific 
community, some universities and some local governments.  
v)  Increased  impact  of  NGOs  and  the  scientific  community  on  the  media  -  and 
consequently on the federal government – through different reports and campaigns 
showing the irrationality of deforestation.  
vi)  Creation  of  new  national  parks  and  other  conservation  units  that  introduced  new 
constraints into areas where deforestation was advancing. 
Since 2007 the capacity of the state to control illegal deforestation in large areas has increased 
so dramatically that a significant part of the remaining deforestation has been reduced to 
small areas that are more difficult to detect by satellite. It is important to highlight that this 
process was carried out without any negative impact on economic growth (Moutinho, 2009). 
The deforestation reductions also changed the carbon intensity of the Brazilian economy: it 
fell in the Amazonian states and grew in the rest of the country.  
In  spite  of  the  relatively  improved  situation  of  Brazil  in  the  modern  global  economy 
compared to the previous decade and the progress made in emissions reduction at national 
level, its GHG trajectory has deteriorated in some relevant economic sectors in recent years. 
Brazil is the only important economy in the world in which there was an increase in carbon 
intensity if deforestation is not taken into account (UNEP, 2009). In the period 1994-2007, 
there was a 50% rise in emissions derived from production and consumption of energy out 
of a GDP growth of 38%. Three factors explain this trajectory: a large expansion of diesel 
consumption – used mostly by trucks – resulting in a dramatic increase in traffic congestion 
in large cities and key roads; the increase in the proportion of electric power coming from 
fossil fuels – from 11% to 15%; and, a strong increase in oil refining (Abranches & Viola, 
2009).  
Brazilian emissions are set to continue to grow at a rate of around 2% a year, in light of the 
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Emissions  from  the  other  relevant sectors  of  the  economy  will  certainly  rise  because  the 
annual rate of GDP growth is estimated at around 3% for the period 2013-16.  
In the international United Nations negotiations, Brazil has so far assumed a general alliance 
with emerging countries with an energy matrix heavily dependent on fossil fuels (China, 
India and South Africa). The advantages of the energy matrix were always subordinated to 
the disadvantages of Amazonian deforestation in the formation of Brazil’s position (Viola, 
2004).  However  at  the  12th  COP  in  Nairobi,  December  2006,  Brazil  started  to  change  its 
historical position, proposing the creation of a global fund for slowing down deforestation.  
Brazil’s role in the global politics of climate change mitigation and adaptation lagged behind 
its  potential  until  2009  because  of  two  major  driving  forces.  First,  entrenched  traditional 
ideas  and  attitudes  about  the  short-term  use  of  natural  resources  had  remained  strong 
throughout  the  whole  society  and  prevailed  in  the  frontier  society.  Second,  a  traditional 
conception of national sovereignty that is poorly adapted to the challenges of the global 
information  society  has  remained  very  strong  among  most  decision-makers,  particularly 
within the military and the foreign service. This approach has undermined most efforts at 
achieving  the  necessary  convergence  between  the  Brazilian  national  interest  and  the 
universal interest in relation to deforestation in the Amazon.  
Following and intensifying the previous trend, in 2009 there was a strong increase in public 
attention  on  the  climate  agenda:  media  coverage,  public  events,  scientific  conferences, 
mobilisation by NGOs and corporate meetings (Viola, 2010). More and more the traditional 
Brazilian  government  position  was  under  siege  in  the  Brazilian  society,  with  two  major 
claims to changing course: assuming goals for emissions in 2020 and supporting REDD+ 
(Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation).  
In this line, governments from Amazon states – under the leadership of Amazon and Mato 
Grosso – created the Amazon Forum in July 2009 and pushed for a change in the Brazilian 
international position in relation to forests. They wanted Brazil to accept the inclusion of 
REDD+  into  the  CDM  or  any  other  market  mechanism.  Also,  three  corporate  coalitions 
launched  documents  in  September  2009  asking  the  political  authorities  to  modify  the 
Brazilian climate standing – both domestically and internationally (Viola, 2010).  
In October 2009 the Minister of the Environment Minc increased his pressure in order to 
change  the  Brazilian  position  in  COP15.  Finally,  after  overcoming  heavy  resistance  from 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Science  and  Technology,  the  new  position  was  announced  both  by 
Minister  Carlos  Minc  and  Minister  Dilma  Rousseff  –  the  latter  of  whom  was  already 
designated a future presidential candidate.  
The Brazilian commitment announced 13 November 2009 has the following characteristics 
(Viola & Machado Filho, 2011): 
i)  It is voluntary, meaning that Brazil decided to go beyond its obligations according to 
the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
ii)  It refers to the carbon emissions growth curve in relation to a Business As Usual (BAU) 
scenario and it is not an obligatory target in reference to a baseline year, unlike those 
commitments adopted by the EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Norway. 
iii)  Brazil  commits  itself  to  reduce  GHG  emissions between  36%  and  39%  having  as  a 
baseline the year 2005 and having as future reference the projected emissions for the 
year  2020  within  a  BAU  scenario.  This  scenario  assumes  that  in  2020  Brazilian 
emissions will grow up to 2.7 billion tonnes of CO2e. The voluntary commitment will 
reduce the emissions to 1.8 billion tonnes, which implies a reduction of 36% to 39%, 6 | EDUARDO VIOLA 
 
having 2005 as a baseline and approximately the same amount of emissions as the year 
2009.  
Parallel to the movements in the executive power sphere, the Federal Congress also began to 
deliver measures regarding climate issues. In October 2009, the House of Representatives 
passed  the  climate  change  bill,  after  significant  efforts  were  made  by  the  trans-party 
environmental  bloc.  Under  the  influence  of  the  new  pro-climate  public  atmosphere,  the 
Senate debated and approved the bill in December 2009. The same process that framed the 
sanction of the federal law also resulted in the creation of the Climate Change National Fund 
(CCNF- law 12,114), conceived as an instrument to assure the necessary financial support for 
mitigation and adaptation projects.  
In  order  to  correctly  evaluate  the  growing  climate  awareness  in  Brazilian  society,  it  is 
important to highlight that in the first round of the presidential elections – 3 October 2010 – 
the Green’s Party candidate Marina Silva came in third place with 19% of the total valid vote, 
excluding abstentions and null votes. Moreover, a recent (December 2012) survey by the 
prestigious DataFolha Institute showed Marina Silva with 18% of vote intentions, second – 
after the President Dilma Rousseff – in the race for president in the election of 2014.  
The Brazilian stance in the COPs of Cancun, Durban and Doha mostly showed continuity 
with the past. Brazil kept the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) alliance as its 
priority, and its main goal is to ensure the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 
with  commitments  of  emissions  reduction  coming  only  from  Annex  1  countries  and  no 
commitments from non-annex 1 countries at least until 2020. However, within the BASIC 
alliance, Brazil has been pushing in favour of some kind of commitments from non-annex 1 
countries  starting  in  2020.  The  individual  positions  of  the  four  BASIC  countries  showed 
regularity  in  the  three  last  COPs  and  could  be  ordered  from  more  progressive  to  more 
conservative in the following way: Brazil, South Africa, China and India.  
During the Durban COP, Brazil attempted to bridge the differences among the major players 
– mostly behind the scenes – trying to diminish the distance between the position of the 
European Union and the other BASIC countries, particularly trying to persuade China and 
India of the need to be more flexible and also, trying to make the American position more 
flexible. At the Doha COP, Brazil was extremely engaged – and convergent with the EU – in 
getting some continuity of the Kyoto Protocol. In spite of the moderately positive diplomatic 
statements about the Doha agreement by representatives of most countries, the opinion of 
this author and researchers linked to its network is that the meeting was a failure.  
3.  Global climate governance and the transition to a low-carbon economy 
The  adoption  of  commitments  for  emissions  reductions  by  Brazil  in  November  2009 
launched a debate inside the government about how to position itself in the Copenhagen 
COP 15. The conservatives wanted to keep the strong alliance with China and India. The 
reformists wanted to distance the country from those that have adopted goals much less 
ambitious than has Brazil. The conservatives prevailed during the conference, since Brazil 
stated  that  the  type  of  ambitious  commitment  that  was  adopted  should  not  apply  as  a 
parameter to other emerging countries.  
Indeed, during 2011-12, a conservative coalition in Congress approved a reform of the Forest 
Code, which gave a partial amnesty to farmers that deforested beyond the legal permit until 
2008.  Many  analysts  fear  that  the  new  Forest  Code  could  increase  deforestation  in  the 
Amazon. Even if this does not happen, for sure it will increase deforestation in the Cerrado 
Savannah, the key agriculture frontier of Brazil.  BRAZIL’S CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE | 7 
 
However,  there  are  some  positive  prospects  for  Brazilian  agriculture.  Sectors  of  the 
government are trying to disseminate the idea of a low-carbon agri-business, where gains in 
productivity do not mean more GHG emissions. This discourse is based on the agricultural 
potential of degraded lands, a more technological use of the land already exploited and the 
progressive expansion of the ‘no-till’ system (Cerri, 2010). Agriculture has historically been 
an area of clash between Brazil and the protectionist policies of the European Union and this 
is likely to continue in the area of low-carbon agriculture.  
In the area of energy, the pace and scale of pre-salt oil exploration is a source of uncertainty 
in the sector. Initially, there was some risk that the pre-salt would put some constraints on 
Brazil’s foreign policy in relation to the transition to a low-carbon economy (Lucena, 2009). 
In fact, there has already been a preview of this effect, with the moderation of the ethanol 
diplomacy since late 2007. In relation to potential consequences of pre-salt over the country’s 
carbon emissions, the prospects are not good either, since the expansion of refinement and 
the  petrochemical  industry  is  already  on  course.  The  key  to  overcoming  this  emissions 
expansion is to use carbon capture and storage in the extraction/refinement of oil and in the 
petrochemical industry. Five years after the announcement of the pre-salt discoveries there is 
clear  delay  in  the  exploration  and  some  doubts  about  its  future:  a  nationalist  trend  has 
limited the participation of foreign companies and Petrobras has been badly managed in the 
last years and is strapped for cash to make the huge investments needed. Moreover, the shale 
gas and tight oil5 revolution in the US and other recently discovered reserves elsewhere in 
the world have diminished the attractiveness of the Brazilian pre-salt.  
The future expansion of ethanol production in Brazil is tied in part to the commoditisation of 
the good in the international market, in a way similar to oil. However, if Brazil tries again to 
consolidate the ethanol policy, it has to guarantee that the production of bio-fuels won’t be 
done through deforestation. This is easy with ethanol but a little more complex in the case of 
bio-diesel because its main raw material is soy, which could retake the penetration in the 
Amazon as happened before 2005. Despite the arguments by some European leadership that 
the ethanol production in the Centre-West and Southwest has pushed the soy and cattle 
ranching frontier further into the Amazon, the dramatic decline in the region’s deforestation 
rate  in  recent  years  shows  the  capability  of  Brazil  to  transform  sugar  ethanol  into  a 
sustainable  global  commodity.  An  important  challenge  for  ethanol  is  how  fast  the  more 
backward sugar-cane cultivating regions will move from labour intensive – primitive labour 
conditions – to mechanisation. The certification of ethanol production could be done in a 
way that constrains the backward part of the ethanol sector. Due to the high acceptance of 
ethanol policies in Brazilian society, these measures could have strong support. However, in 
the last two years there has been a dramatic stagnation in the production of ethanol due to 
several factors: the government signalling its priority for oil exploration, a freeze on gas and 
diesel prices that undermined the competitiveness of ethanol and the lack of development of 
new infrastructure for ethanol transportation (ethanol pipelines).  
The construction of new thermoelectric power plants based on oil or coal seems to be over 
for now, although there would be an increase in natural gas thermoelectric plants in the 
whole country and particularly in the Amazon because of the exploration of significant gas 
reserves in the centre-west Brazilian Amazon, relatively close to the city of Manaus – the 
most important city in the world located in the middle of a tropical forest with around 2 
million inhabitants and a huge industrial sector. On the other hand, hydropower is back. 
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Today, less than 10% of the total hydropower production comes from the Amazon, but the 
expansion of this activity will be concentrated in this region and should be done with high 
efficiency  with  respect  to  the  conversion  of  forests.  The  plans  and  the  already  ongoing 
construction for two large hydropower plants on the Madeira River, in the border area with 
Bolivia, are environmentally friendly for the first time in Amazonian history. It remains to be 
seen how deep the shift will be in the final outcome. A third large dam in Belo Monte (in the 
state  of  Para),  whose  construction  was  initiated  in  2011,  has  given  rise  to  strong 
controversies.  
For  the  Brazilian  mindset,  hydropower  is  fully  equal  to  wind  and  solar  as  a  renewable 
energy.  The  fact  that  the  European  Union  has  an  approach  with  some  restrictions  on 
hydropower  is  an  area  of  dispute  between  both  entities.  A  change  to  a  more  friendly 
approach to hydropower from the European Union would be a major factor of convergence.  
There is no planning at present for future deployment in solar photovoltaic power, despite 
its huge potential, and there is a strong lobby among the decision-makers and infrastructure 
building  corporations  in  favour  of  hydropower  (cheaper)  that  blocks  any  advance 
(Marcovitch et al., 2010). Strong subsidies would be needed for photovoltaic and this is an 
area  where  the  scientific  community  could  have  a  key  role,  but  it  would  be  difficult  to 
implement. In the case of wind power, on the contrary, a favourable trend has begun to take 
shape since 2009 (Dutra & Szklo, 2008).  
In the critical area of transportation – both cargo and public for passengers – the climate law 
and Brazil’s submission to the Copenhagen Accord have been negligent. Especially if we 
consider the terrible performance the sector has had in the last two decades. Among some 
crucial options to reverse this situation are the following: upgrade the road network and 
hubs, replace old vehicles, expand the railroads, integrate road and railroads, introduce the 
hybrid electric car and improve conventional ones and establish fast bus systems following 
the  example  of  the  city  of  Curitiba  (McKynsey,  2009).  Some  European  systems  of public 
transportation, in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany for example, are an inspiration 
and  point  of  reference  for  Brazilian  reformist  forces.  This  is  an  area  of  significant 
potentialities for more cooperation between both entities.  
The transportation sector has remarkable and highly visible co-benefits between climate and 
quality  of  life,  since  the  poor  transportation  infrastructure  is  crucial  in  degrading  the 
everyday  life  of  most  urban  residents  (traffic  congestion,  pollution,  much  time  lost  in 
commuting). Besides this, transportation – together with public security – poses the greatest 
bottlenecks for successfully organising the two sports mega-events: the 2014 Football World 
Cup  and  the  2016  Rio  Olympic  Games.  However,  the  enormous  amount  of  investment 
needed and the prospect of positive results (and political gains) materialising only in the 
mid-term, conspires against a more rational management of the situation. The lobby of the 
automotive sector has also been an obstacle to the transition to a less carbon-intensive and 
less road-based paradigm. In 2010, for instance, within the Lula da Silva administration, pro 
status-quo  interests  were  able  to  stop  a  project  that  encouraged  the  use  of  electric  cars. 
Although  with  very  limited  chance  of  success,  a  political  strategy  focused  on  those  co-
benefits could be used to advance mitigation policies in the area (Viola & Franchini, 2011).  
Despite their limited impact in reducing carbon emissions, improvements in basic sanitation 
and waste disposal – including the construction of power plants fed by methane – are areas 
offering  high  co-benefits  and  other  big  improvements,  because  they  encounter  low 
resistance. Another policy that could be easy to implement would be promoting a culture 
and organisation development of civil defence, an area where Brazil is very poor and in 
which  recent  extreme  climate  events  (flooding,  droughts,  severe  storms)  have  raised BRAZIL’S CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE | 9 
 
awareness  about  the  risks  of  climate  change.  The  partnership  with  the  military  is  very 
important since they have good capabilities in this area.  
4.  Conclusions 
Summarising  the  prospects  regarding  the  past  and  the  future  GHG  emissions  reduction 
trajectory and policies in Brazil, one can say the following: 
First, the best mitigation opportunities in the country can be found in deforestation control – 
and the occupation of degraded lands – and in the energy sector – improving the efficiency 
and  the  progress  of  ethanol.  The  transportation  sector,  however,  shows  a  pessimistic 
scenario, where the consumption of diesel oil grows expressively.  
Second, up to now, the advances made by Brazil in reducing GHG emissions have been 
located in low resistance sectors. As already reported, a big part of that mitigation effort 
came as a result of deforestation control, a sector that is irrelevant in terms of economic 
growth. Because of this situation, the Brazilian government never had to invest heavily in 
strategies to reduce the political cost of mitigation actions.  
Third – but profoundly related with the previous point – in order to advance with mitigation 
options  in  more  resistant  areas,  it  would  be  necessary  to  build  up  more  robust  climate 
coalitions than have existed in the past. A clear example of this situation is the poor state of 
the transportation system.  
Brazil’s role in the global politics of climate change mitigation and adaptation has lagged 
behind its potentiality so far, because of two major factors: entrenched traditional ideas and 
attitudes about short-term use of natural resources and a traditional conception of national 
sovereignty  that  is  poorly  adapted  to  the  challenges  of  the  global  economy,  particularly 
among military officers and diplomats. There has been some progress, but very modest until 
very recently.  
The  presence  of  Marina  Silva,  as  the  Green  Party  presidential  candidate,  introduced  the 
transition to a low-carbon economy as a topic in the electoral campaign and her performance 
in the first round of the election almost assures that the issue will remain on the public 
agenda for the next years 
The National Congress passed a climate change law that establishes a voluntary emissions 
reduction  target  and  in  that  way  partially  internalised  the  issue  into  the  country’s  legal 
structure.  The  Ministry  of  Environment  progressively  raised  its  profile  during  2009  and 
finally defeated the powerful conservative sector of the federal government when the new 
plan of reduction targets was announced.  
There  are  of  course,  many  doubts  regarding  the  future  implementation  of  the  Brazilian 
commitment, but this new legislation and the targets assumed by the country in the context 
of the Copenhagen Accord are fundamental steps in relation to the future trajectory of the 
foreign, economic, energy, agricultural, forest and climate policies. 
There are two new big questions from 2013 to the near future. The first one is how big will be 
the implementation gap of the new climate policy. The second one is for how long will Brazil 
maintain the recently created imbalance between the domestic climate policy with reduction 
targets and the alliance with the more conservative emerging powers like China, Russia and 
India. Given the interests and relative power of different economic sectors and the dynamics 
of the public opinion, it is probable that this imbalance will not last long, and the Brazilian 
position will tend to converge with the more advanced EU, Japan and South Korea.  
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Areas of potential cooperation between the EU and Brazil 
For  this  and  other  reasons,  the  potential  is  high  for  more  convergence  and  cooperation 
between Brazil and the EU. A lot will depend on the skills of European diplomacy and the 
behaviour of the progressive European corporations and on the advance of reformist socio-
economic forces inside Brazil. In particular, the areas of potential cooperation between the 
European Union and Brazil may be the following:6 
  Biofuel.  Elimination  of  barriers  for  international  trade  and  promoting  joint 
technological development in second-generation ethanol. Starting negotiations of a 
Free Trade Area in biofuels between the EU and Mercosur.  
  Hydropower. The EU might move to a more friendly approach to the development of 
hydropower.  
  REDD+.  The  EU  is  promoting  reduction  of  deforestation  in  Brazil,  which  should 
contribute specifically to the Amazonian Fund (Norway already contributing); and, 
Brazil and the EU should work together on REDD+ in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia.  
  Solar and Wind Power. The EU (particularly Denmark, Germany and Portugal) and 
Brazil can promote direct investment in Brazil, with joint technological development.  
  Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Joint technological development, strengthening the 
role  of  Norway,  the  Statoil  Corporation  and  the  EU  in  Brazil.  Increasing 
interdependence  of  services  in  the  oil  and  gas  industries  will  strengthen 
environmental protection.  
  Systemic  Energy  Efficiency.  Joint  technological  development  and  transferring  of 
managerial and organisational capabilities from the EU to Brazil.  
  Smart Grids. Promoting technology transfer from EU to Brazil and joint technological 
development.  
  Nuclear  energy.  Increasing  cooperation  between  the  European  Union  (particularly 
France) and Brazil in technological development, safety and non-proliferation.  
  Public transportation and urban mobility. Brazil can learn from some countries of the EU 
(particularly the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark) on how to make a dramatic 
shift  in  urban  mobility  and  promote  the  development  of  public  transportation, 
including  trains,  metro  and  boats.  The  EU  supports  the  recent  initiative  of  the 
Brazilian government to promote a major development in railway systems. Increased 
European investment in Brazil mass transportation, joint technological development 
and transferring of managerial and organisational capabilities.  
  Systematic consultation and convergence in the UN multilateral negotiations and the G20. 
Brazil as a bridge between the European Union and BASIC/BRICS on global climate 
governance.  
   
                                                   
6 These potentialities are based on the author’s assessment according to players and opinions that are 
relevant  in  Brazilian  society,  but  they  have  not  prevailed  in  government  so  far.  None  of  the 
potentialities is likely to materialise in the near future, at least not before the EU overcomes the more 
critical phase of the economic crisis and Brazil chooses a new president and Congress in 2014. BRAZIL’S CLIMATE POLICY SINCE 2005: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND PROSPECTIVE | 11 
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